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INTRODUCTION

The sovereignty of nation states is of particular interest in this time of
increasing globalization and integration. Of course, that is to be expected as
sovereign power has changed throughout time, taking on new aspects and
shedding old ones. This transient nature will undoubtedly affect or try to affect
those parts of the law that depend on sovereignty such as patent law, which is
the subject of this Note. But first, in order to understand this, the nature of
sovereignty must be determined.
An adequate definition might be elusive given the changing nature of the
subject, but Daniel Philpott, a professor from Notre Dame, has provided a
definition that is quite suitable due to its specificity and simplicity.2 Philpott
defines sovereignty as “supreme authority within a territory”.3 Under this
“supreme authority” arose the concepts of patents and the notorious
presumption against extraterritoriality that rests within American law. What then
are these concepts and how do they fit within the binding system that is our law?
A patent is something that “cover{s} practical inventions in the ‘useful
arts’.”4 In order for an individual to be granted a patent, it must be “new and
nonobvious.”5 It remains open for a period of twenty years, and during that
twenty years, no one can “make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import the invention.”6
Regarding the scope, it has been famously said that patents can cover “anything
under the sun that is made by man.”7 This scope, however, has been built off of
and limited by domestic concerns.8 It is this limitation to domestic concerns in
our law that is also the basis of the presumption against extraterritoriality.
What is this presumption? The presumption against extraterritoriality is the
concept that when a court is analyzing a law, it is to be presumed that the law
only applies domestically with no foreign effect.9 If the law is to have foreign
effect, Congress must explicitly state that motivation.10 The Supreme Court has
stated that the “[c]ourts presume that federal statutes apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”11 The Court further notes that this
is because of “the commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with
domestic concerns in mind.”12
2 Daniel Philpott, Sovereignty, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Mar. 26, 2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/sovereignty.
3 Id.
4 ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS, A CONCISE GUIDE 14 (5th ed. 2018).
5 Id. at 15.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 25 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
8 Id. at 15.
9 WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp, 138 S.Ct. 2129, 2136 (2018).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
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How then does this presumption affect patents? WesternGeco LLC v. ION
Geophysical Corp. provides the requisite backdrop for the presumption.13 The
Court analyzed the Patent Act and looked at whether or not some of the
stipulations of the Patent Act rebutted the presumption against extraterritoriality,
thereby extending the Patent Act to a direct foreign effect.14 The Court decided
not to answer that question, as it did not see a need to do so.15 Additionally, the
Court thought that in answering the question, it would raise issues that it thought
unwise to answer.16 The goal of this Note will be to take up where the Court left
off and provide an adequate answer to the question. First, I will provide
background on the history of patents, the presumption against extraterritoriality,
and the WesternGeco LLC case. Next, I will contend that the Patent Act does not
rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. In light of this interpretation, I
will argue that Congress should not rewrite the law so as to rebut the
presumption because to do so would extend the reach of sovereignty beyond its
reasonable limit.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. TRACING THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF PATENT LAW

First, the history of patent law and the Patent Act must be detailed. Patent
law has a fascinating history.17 Part of what makes it so intriguing is that there is
a noticeable lack of documentation describing the advent of patent law.18 In fact,
one author notes, “patent history is a subject that is still largely waiting to be
written.”19 However, that has not stopped some from trying. In his book, Patent
Law Essentials: A Concise Guide, Alan Durham attempts to briefly describe the
origin and evolution of patent law in the United States.20 He notes that United
States patent law, as in many other areas, had its origin in England.21 Until the
seventeenth century, patents were, as Durham describes it, a “legally sanctioned
monopoly.”22 While this concept of patents continued for some time, it
ultimately evolved:

Id.
Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 2136-37.
17 See Phillip Johnson, Privatized Law Reform: A History of Patent Law Through Private
Legislation, 1620-1907 (2018).
18 Id. at 1.
19 Id.
20 Durham, supra note 3, at 1.
21 Id.
22 Id.
13
14
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Undoubtedly popular with the government and with the patent
owners, these “odious monopolies” were a source of resentment
to consumers and potential competitors. In 1624, the Crown
relented and the Statute of Monopolies, abolishing the general
power of the monarch to grant exclusive rights, became law.
Importantly, the statute ending the general practice of
monopolies specifically exempted patents allowing inventors the
exclusive right to their inventions.23
This “exclusive right” was carried over to the colonies, which eventually
became the United States.24 The idea was so compelling that it was put into the
United States Constitution, which gives Congress the power to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”25
Durham correctly notes that this clause is the source of patent law for this
country.26 Durham continues his introduction to patents by describing some of
the theoretical frameworks behind the concept.27 One such theory is that
inventors have a “natural right” over their inventions.28 Another theory, which
Durham articulates as more apparent in the Constitution itself, is one that is more
pragmatic in form. Under this theory, a patent’s purpose is to provide incentive
for inventors to act. Because patents provide protection for new ideas, inventors
will seek to invent because they can adequately profit from it.29 Additionally the
patent system allows for inventions to be adequately described for the use of the
public so as to further increase social usefulness.30
Patents further evolved through the 1836 Patent Act.31 The modern Patent
Office was created by this act in order to evaluate applications for patents. 32
However, that was not the only major change. Additionally, the rationale
underlying patent law shifted from concepts of productivity and social usefulness
to one of property rights for the inventor (regardless of whether the invention
was at all useful).33 In this way, economic development no longer became the
primary question when determining whether to issue or approve a patent.34
Id.
Id.
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26 See Durham, supra note 3, at 20.
27 Id. at 2.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 263,
293-97 (2016).
32 Id. at 263.
33 Id.
34 Id.
23
24
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The Patent Act continued to change over the next century. In 1984, Congress
added amendments to the Act, which are quite important to the discussion this
note focuses on.35 These amendments are 271(f)(1) and 271(f)(2), which state as
follows:
(f)(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be
supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion
of the components of a patented invention, where such
components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner
as to actively induce the combination of such components
outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the
patent if such combination occurred within the United States,
shall be liable as an infringer;36
(f)(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be
supplied in or from the United States any component of a
patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted
for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use, where
such component is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing
that such component is so made or adapted and intending that
such component will be combined out- side of the United States
in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.37
These amendments are the focus on whether or not the Patent Act rebuts the
presumption against extraterritoriality.
B. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN PATENT LAW

The presumption is an old rule that extends far back in time.38 One example
of its use is the case of Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., in which the Supreme
Court had to reckon with the idea of extraterritoriality.39 In that case, the
defendant company had created an alleged monopoly and hindered the business
of the plaintiff.40 However most of the defendants’ actions were done outside

Patent Law Amendments of 1984, H.R. 6286, 98th Cong. (1984).
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)(2010).
37 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2)(2010).
38 See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 Berkeley J.
Int’l L. 85, 85 (1998).
39 Id.; see also Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347(1909).
40 Id. at. 355.
35
36
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the territory of the United States.41 The Court wrote as follows regarding the
extraterritorial nature of the case:
No doubt in regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas,
or to no law that civilized countries would recognize as adequate,
such countries may treat some relations between their citizens as
governed by their own law, and keep to some extent the old
notion of personal sovereignty alive. They go further, at times,
and declare that they will punish anyone, subject or not, who
shall do certain things, if they can catch him, as in the case of
pirates on the high seas. In cases immediately affecting national
interests they may go further still and may make, and, if they get
the chance, execute similar threats as to acts done within another
recognized jurisdiction. . .But the general and almost universal
rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done.42
The general rule of law then is that the law of the country where the act is
done is the binding law.43 This naturally excludes the law of the United States as
the act was done within the bounds of another sovereign country. The Court
echoed this in explaining the nature of the presumption.44 The Court stated, “all
legislation is prima facie territorial.”45 In other words, legislation is presumed to
only affect the territory under the sovereignty of the United States until proven
otherwise. This was considered a strong point in time for the presumption’s
influence.46 In more modern times, it has been said that the presumption has
weakened, including the antitrust issues found in Am. Banana Co.47 However, as
William S. Dodge comments, this is an exaggeration:
Like Mark Twain’s death, however, reports of the presumption’s
demise were greatly exaggerated. In its 1991 decision in E.E.O.C.
v. Arabian American Oil Co. (“Aramco”), the Supreme Court
applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to Title VII,
concluding that the statute did not apply to employment

41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Id.
Id. at 355-356 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 513.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Dodge, supra note 37, at 85-86.
Id.
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discrimination by an American company against an American
citizen that occurred abroad.48
Dodge further notes that while there was good evidence in that case that
Congress had intended to apply Title VII extraterritorially, the Court ruled
otherwise. Rather than looking at Congress’ intent, the Court instead held that a
“clear statement” was needed in the statute for the law to apply
extraterritorially.49 The above case shows that even if Congress is explicit in its
action, the court may nevertheless apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality.50 In light of the Court’s reasoning, it appears that the
presumption is very much alive and well. This is not to say, however, that
Congress cannot make laws with extraterritorial application or that the
presumption is as strong as it once was. It is only to say that the presumption is
still something courts apply. This is evident in the case of WesternGeco LLC v.
ION Geophysical Corp.,51 which is the focus of this Note.
The Court in WesternGeco provides the answer to the question on how to rebut
the presumption. The Court states:
It can be rebutted only if the text provides a “clear indication of
an extraterritorial application.” If the presumption against
extraterritoriality has not been rebutted, the second step of our
framework asks “whether the case involves a domestic
application of the statute.” Courts make this determination by
identifying “the statute’s ‘focus’” and asking whether the conduct
relevant to that focus occurred in United States territory. If it did,
then the case involves a permissible domestic application of the
statute.52
A clear indication then is required by Congress in order to rebut the
presumption. However, the nature of a “clear indication” is hotly debated.53
Dodge notes that there are three views on the subject. The first is that acts of
Congress only apply to the United States itself, even if foreign action has an effect
on the United States.54 A second view is that acts of Congress apply “only to
conduct that has effects within the United States, regardless of where the conduct

Id.
Id.
50 Id.
51 WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S.Ct. 2129, 2136 (2018).
52 Id. (first quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255, 130 S. Ct.
2869 (2010); then quoting RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016)).
53 Dodge, supra note 37, at 88.
54 Id. at 89-90.
48
49
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occurs.”55 A third view is that Congressional acts apply to conduct within the
United States or that has effects within the United States.56
Congress then would need to provide a clear indication to extend a law
beyond these types of situations at the very least.57 The question then is whether
the Patent Act clearly indicates Congress’s intention to extend beyond at least
these three views. The answer to that question would undoubtedly solve the
problem posed in WesternGeco.58
C. LOOKING AT THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY WITHIN
THE CONTEXT OF WESTERNGECO LLC V. ION GEOPHYSICAL CORP.

The case of WesternGeco is the focus of this note, and a brief explanation of
its history is needed. In this case, WesternGeco LLC, the owner of a patent
system which was used to survey the ocean floor, was suing ION Geophysical
Corp. for selling parts which were in turn used to create the patented system in
another country.59 At trial, the jury found for WesternGeco and ordered ION to
pay for lost profits stemming from the sale of the identical survey invention.60
ION moved to set aside the verdict on the grounds that patents do not apply
extraterritorially.61 The Federal Circuit agreed with ION, noting that
WesternGeco could not recover lost profits because Section 271(f) does not
apply extraterritorially.62 The case then went to the Supreme Court. The Court
laid down its step-by-step analysis in order to determine whether WesternGeco
could receive lost profits.63 The Court noted that there are two steps to
determine whether or not there has been an improper extension of a law from
domestic application to foreign application.64 The first step deals with the
presumption of extraterritoriality; however, the Court refused to answer the
question as to whether the Patent Act, specially 271(f), rebutted the presumption
against extraterritoriality.65 Instead, the Court chose to skip to the second step,
as it is allowed to do.66 The Court noted that “while ‘it will usually be preferable’
to begin with step one, courts have the discretion to begin at step two ‘in
appropriate cases.’”67 The second step deals with the notion of “domestic
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id.
Id.
Id.
WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S.Ct. 2129, 2136-37 (2018).
Id. at 2135.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2136.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.(quoting RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016)).
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application.”68 If the law has a valid domestic application and applies in the case,
then there is no invalid foreign application.69 The Court took this position in
allowing the recovery of lost profits.70 The Court ruled that the Act’s domestic
application was meant to stop people from exporting parts from the U.S. to
foreign countries to build the invention.71 The penalty, then, is not for the
building of the item in a foreign country per se but the exporting of items from
the United States to the foreign entity.72
Why did the Court decide not to answer the first step? The reason the Court
gives is that it is not required to do so and that it would be unwise to do so in
this specific case.73 Justice Thomas expands upon this point as follows:
We resolve this case at step two. While “it will usually be
preferable” to begin with step one, courts have the discretion to
begin at step two “in appropriate cases.” One reason to exercise
that discretion is if addressing step one would require resolving
“difficult questions” that do not change “the outcome of the
case,” but could have far-reaching effects in future cases. That is
true here. WesternGeco argues that the presumption against
extraterritoriality should never apply to statutes, such as § 284,
that merely provide a general damages remedy for conduct that
Congress has declared unlawful. Resolving that question could
implicate many other statutes besides the Patent Act. We
therefore exercise our discretion to forgo the first step of our
extraterritoriality framework.74
The Court thinks it wise to forgo an answer, as the answer would open up
Pandora’s box, so to speak.75 To expound further, the questions raised in
answering the question posed by the first step would lead to unintended side
effects that could easily be avoided by skipping to the second step of the
analysis.76 The purpose of this Note therefore will be to answer that first question
the Court decided to forgo: Does the presumption against extraterritoriality
apply to the Patent Act specifically sections 271(f)(1)77 and 271(f)(2)?78 The
answer is, emphatically, yes.
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at 2137.
Id. at 2138.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2136.
Id. at 2136-37 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010).
Id.
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ANALYSIS

The presumption of extraterritoriality applies to the Patent Act. The sections
in question, as stated previously, are sections 271(f)(1)79 and 271(f)(2).80 The first
issue is whether Congress gave a clear indication through the language of the
amendments to extend the Patent Act beyond our domestic borders. This does
not appear to be the case. Oddly enough, it is the Court’s language in WesternGeco
that provides this rationale despite the fact that it refused to answer the question
directly. In order to answer the second step, as previously described, the Court
needed to establish the statute’s focus:
When determining the focus of a statute, we do not analyze the
provision at issue in a vacuum. If the statutory provision at issue
works in tandem with other provisions, it must be assessed in
concert with those other provisions. Otherwise, it would be
impossible to accurately determine whether the application of
the statute in the case is a “domestic application.
And determining how the statute has actually been applied is the
whole point of the focus test. Applying these principles here, we
conclude that the conduct relevant to the statutory focus in this
case is domestic.81
The Court emphasizes here that the focus of the statute is the domestic
application of it.82 Although one might argue that a statute’s domestic focus does
not preclude the possibility that Congress intended the statute to have
extraterritorial effect, such an effect would be a secondary focus as opposed to
the primary focus. As such, any argument in favor of Congress’ intent for it to
apply extraterritorially would ultimately fail because the Court places a lot of
emphasis on how the statute is to apply domestically. The Court states:
Section 271(f)(2) focuses on domestic conduct. It provides that
a company “shall be liable as an infringer” if it “supplies” certain
components of a patented invention “in or from the United
States” with the intent that they “will be combined outside of the
United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such
combination occurred within the United States.” The conduct

79
80
81
82

Id.
Id.
WesternGeco LLC, 138 S.Ct. at 2137 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2138.
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that § 271(f)(2) regulates—i.e., its focus—is the domestic act of
“suppl[ying] in or from the United States.”83
The problem then with the hypothetical objection previously mentioned is
that the secondary application of extraterritorial effect would contradict the
primary application of domestic regulation. The Court here interprets the
language of the statute as only dealing with actions within the United States
itself.84 If there were to be a secondary extraterritorial intention then it would
have to be said that actions within the United States and its jurisdiction are both
territorial and extraterritorial in the same manner. In this case, the limitation
placed on the exportation of certain components from the United States would
itself be extraterritorial. This cannot be the case, however, as the act of exporting
is an act done by the exporter within the jurisdiction it is exporting from. Thus,
to regulate this domestic act would then suggest that it is not to regulate any
foreign party’s action outside the United States; as such, it cannot be
extraterritorial.
For illustration of this point, imagine there are three individuals: A, B, and C.
Next, imagine that A gives B an item on the condition that B will not give that
item to C. If B gives C the item, then A will punish B by taking the value of the
item from B, but will not, however, take the item away from C. A then is not
regulating or punishing any action of C. A is only regulating the actions of B. In
the same way, the Patent Act (A) is only regulating the actions of exporters within
the United States (B) who export certain items to foreign actors (C). The act is
not regulating the actions of the foreign actors, as there is neither punishment
affecting them nor prohibition of action to punish.
Additional problems arise if the regulation of the act of exporting is deemed
extraterritorial because of its down the line effect on foreign entities. First, the
presumption is not only rebuttable by the Patent Act, but by all laws generally
since any language used could have extraterritorial effect through a long causal
chain and, as such, could be said to have extraterritorial effect. In the case of the
Patent Act, the act prevents the exporting of components from the United States
to other countries. The regulatory action directly affects the action of those
exporting from within the territory of the United States. To say that the law has
extraterritorial application when regulating actions within the United States
would extend the presumption too far.
There is an old proverb that states that whenever a butterfly flaps its wings,
it causes a hurricane on the other side of the world.85 What this saying means is
that a minor action can have great causal effect through long causal chains. 86
Id. at 2137-38.
Id.
85 What is Chaos Theory?, FRACTAL FOUNDATION
https://fractalfoundation.org/resources/what-is-chaos-theory/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2019).
86 Id.
83
84
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However, this long causal chain cannot be the basis of determining
extraterritorial effect and the need to rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Any law ever made could be said to have some foreign effect
through long causal chains as the butterfly example implies. The presumption is
a unique and defined concept that should not be extended to the point that it
adopts a sweeping definition that covers anything and everything. If the
presumption is interpreted in this way, it would lose any definitive application in
future cases.
One might argue that the Patent Act’s supposed foreign effect is not like a
long causal chain in that the first cause is only indirectly causing some other thing
down the line. Rather, in the case of the Patent Act, there is a direct link between
the limitation of the exporting of components and the foreign effect. While this
sounds reasonable at first blush, the objection is simply untenable. In this case
of the Patent Act, foreign affairs are only affected indirectly. As the Court already
noted in WesternGeco, the Patent Act regulates the “domestic.”87 It regulates the
actions of those companies that happen within the United States and not the
actions that come later.88 In other words, it directly affects domestic companies
while only indirectly affecting foreign affairs. Another way to put it is that the
Patent Act positively affects domestic actors while at best only providing a
negative cause for foreign actors. Jonathan Edwards, in his book On the Freedom
of the Will, provides an illustration of the philosophical concept of a negative
cause:
As there is a vast difference between the sun’s being the cause of
the lightsomeness and warmth of the atmosphere, and [the]
brightness of gold and diamonds, by its presence and positive
influence; and its being the occasion of darkness and frost, in the
night, by its motion, whereby it descends below the horizon. The
motion of the sun is the occasion of the latter kind of events; but
it is not the proper cause, efficient or producer of them; though
they are necessarily consequent on that motion, under such
circumstances.89
The Patent Act is like the sun in the illustration. It positively and efficiently
regulates or acts on the domestic exporters of this country. However, the effect
on the foreign actors though a necessary consequence of the actions taken
domestically are not positively and efficiently caused by those actions. To claim
this as direct would open up any causal chain to being direct in the manner
thought by the objection as all consequents, as opposed to only those things

WesternGeco LLC, 138 S.Ct. at 2138.
Id.
89 JONATHAN EDWARDS, FREEDOM OF THE WILL, reprinted in THE WORKS OF JONATHAN
EDWARDS, Vol. 1, 404 (Paul Ramsey ed., 1957)(2011).
87
88

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol27/iss1/4

12

Lowe: "Westerngeco" and the Patent Act: An Analysis of the Patent Act a

2019]

WESTERNGECO AND THE PATENT ACT

109

positively caused, would be considered direct. However, could it not be the case
that the intentional language of stopping the export of certain items because they
are used for the building of patented items in foreign nations is the direct link
needed to establish a direct causal chain? I answer in the negative. If Congress
wished to make a true extraterritorial effect then why not make the actions done
outside the United States punishable instead? This language would certainly have
a direct effect on foreign lands and would rebut the presumption quite easily.
Congress elected not to do this, however, and instead chose to only make
punishable those actions done within the United States.90 Because of this indirect
link, it cannot be said that the Patent Act rebuts the presumption against
extraterritoriality, as there is no extraterritorial application in the first place.
Even though the presumption against extraterritoriality is not rebutted
regarding the Patent Act, Congress could still update the Act to do so. The better
question is whether they should. My answer is that they should not update the
Patent Act. First, patents, as previously noted, are of a domestic concern that
serves the public.91 The public, in this instance, cannot be the public of the world
or of some foreign country.92 The public, as it is understood here, is the public
of the United States and the Patent Act serves and binds within that sphere.93
Second, it must also be noted that while ideas are forms of property and
protected by the patent system, patented items are unlike other forms of
property.94 It is not okay to steal real tangible items from a person within the
United States. It does not matter how long you have owned the item—the item
is yours and cannot be used or taken by another without your permission (in
most cases). This is not the case with patents. Patents do not possess the
permanence of normal everyday property.95 There is a limit to how long they
have effect as they are unlike tangible ownership and some forms of intangible
ownership.96
Similarly, a patent extends beyond the ordinary ownership of property.97 A
patent not only protects against the theft from nefarious actors, but from the use
of the idea discovered independent of the original patent owner.98 This
intangibility aspect where person A can discover the patented idea completely
independently of person B divorces patents from the concept of ownership of
tangible property. Indeed, tangible ownership of real and personal property are
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35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010).
Durham, supra note 3, at 15.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 9-16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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instances of owning something that is finite. To say one owns an idea is to say
one owns something beyond this or that particular example of that idea.99
The extension of patent law then over foreign sovereignties would be quite
the mess. First, the logistics would require a system where both countries are
truthful to the fullest extent. Second, it would require some form of higher
authority to hold both accountable. The problem with the higher authority is that
it does not automatically provide for U.S. patent law to extend to other countries.
Rather, it provides for a neutral third-party to govern patents. Furthermore, it
raises the question of sovereign empathy.100 Would Americans be okay with
other countries attempting to enforce their own patent law system when one of
our own citizens independently discovers an idea and wants to use it within our
own jurisdiction? I think not. But, if we can acknowledge that we would not wish
that to occur to in our own country, then we should not wish it to happen to
other foreign jurisdictions eithers. The logistical problem previously mentioned
naturally also plays a role in this problem.101 The extension would cause tension
and flare-ups between countries that could lead to consequences not intended.102
Paired with the idea that patents are intended to be domestic concerns that
promote the discovery of new ideas and inventions within a certain jurisdiction
and the case for extraterritorial extension of the Patent Act seems even more
unwise.103
IV.

CONCLUSION

WesternGeco is a fascinating case that covers multiple problems and illuminates
new paths and ideas. The Court reasoned that it would be wise to answer the
question regarding the presumption against extraterritoriality another day and
chose to look to the second step of the test. However, the Court should have
answered in the affirmative that the Patent Act does not rebut the presumption
against extraterritoriality. To allow the Patent Act to rebut the presumption
would allow any law to rebut it with any language. The language of the Patent
Act only regulates the domestic actors within the United States itself.
Additionally, Congress should not update the Patent Act in order to apply a
foreign application. The logistics of doing so would be catastrophic.
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